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CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
by Richard D. Friedman
University of Michigan
On June 9, by granting certiorari in
Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the
Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter
once again into the realm of the Confrontation
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Roberts rubric, addressing the admissibility of
a statement interlocking with one made by the
accused. The chief interest of the case,
though, lies with the second question:

Clause, in which it has found itself deeply
perplexed. This time there was a difference,
however, because the grant indicated that the
Court might be willing to rethink its
jurisprudence in this area.

Whether this Court should reevaluate the
Confrontation Clause framework
established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980), and hold that the Clause
unequivocally prohibits the admission of
out-of-court statements insofar as they are
contained in "testimonial" materials. such
as tape-recorded custodial statements.

Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530
(1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116
(1999), presents a classic case of what might
be called station-house testimony. Michael
Crawford was accused of stabbing another
man. His wife, Sylvia, was present at the
scene, and later that evening made a recorded
statement to the police, in the station-house.
In context, the statement was damaging to
Michael's contention of self-defense. Sylvia
was unavailable to testify at trial.'
Accordingly, the prosecution offered the
station-house statement. It was admitted over
Michael's objection that it violated his right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.". Michael was convicted, and eventually
the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
conviction. It deemed Sylvia's statement to be
sufficiently reliable to withstand scrutiny under
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), because
it "interlocked" to a significant degree with a
station-house statement made by Michael
himself.

The certiorari grant was unqualified, and the
petitioner's brief concentrates primarily on the
second question. So do two amicus briefs filed
in support of the petitioner - one for the
National A.ssociation of Criminal Defense
Lawyers. the American Civil Liberties Union.
and the ACLU's Washington affiliate, and the
other by me for eight other law professors and
myself. By the way, the State did us a favor by
not consenting to us file these briefs. As far as
I was concerned that did us a big favor. It
meant that I could include nice biographical
sketches of the signers of our brief in a motion
for leave to file - which I am relieved to sav
the Court has granted - without it counting
against our page limit: the statement of interest
in the brief itself just referred to the motion.

The petition for cerriorari posed two
questions. One was a narro\\,: one, \Vithin the

Under Roberts. any hearsay by an out-ofcourt declarant poses a potential confrontation
problem. If the statement is deemed reliable
- a conclusion that may be drawn if the
statement fits within a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception
it is usually admissible
nevertheless, though in the case of former
testimony and perhaps some other statements
the hearsay is still not admissible unless the
declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. This
framework is utterly unsupported by the text of
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Formally, Michael asserted the spousal
privilege that Washington law affords him,
but this does not appear to affect the case,
and has barely been mentioned in the papers
before the Supreme Court; it is apparent that
Sylvia, who later pied guilty to a charge
arising out of the incident, was unwilling to
testify against Michael, and she could have
refused on the basis of her privilege against
self-incrimination.
3

State's brief is, frankly, rather lackadaisical. It
contends, for example, that there is no basis
for rendering all hearsay inadmissible-but of
course nobody has advocated that position.
Far more interesting is an amicus brief
submitted the Solicitor General's Office

the Confrontation Clause, which does not refer
to hearsay or reliability, and by its history. The
history of the Clause makes clear that it was
meant to ensure that - in contrast to some
systems used on the European Continent and
courts like the Star Chamber that followed
their model - witnesses against a criminal
defendant were brought "face to face" with the
accused, at trial ifreasonably possible, to give
their testimony. The scope of the ~lause
therefore is limited to statements that by their
nature are testimonial. The exact bounds of
the category of testimonial statements may not
be exact, but the essence is clear: If a statement
is made in circumstances in which a
reasonable person would realize that it would
likely be used (if allowed) as evidence in a
criminal prosecution, then it is testimonial, for
the declarant is knowingly creating evidence.
Station-house statements are paradigmatic
examples of the focus of the Clause testimonial statements made without
confrontation.

In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the
Government advocated something like the
testimonial approach, and now it does so
again, with a clearer emphasis on the
testimonial nature of statements that are
covered by the Clause.
But now the
Government contends that, even ifa statement
is testimonial but the accused has not had an
opportunity for confrontation. it may
nevertheless be admitted if the witness is
unavailable and the statement is deemed
reliable.
One might say that this prosecutorial-minded
argument seeks to take the bitter without the
sweet - it seeks to limit the scope of the
Confrontation Clause as defined by Roberts
but not to bolster the force of the Clause within
the reduced scope. For at least three reasons,
I believe it would be most unfortunate to
couple adoption of the testimonial approach
with retention of reliability analysis for
unavailable witnesses.

If the scope of the Clause is limited to
testimonial statements, there is no need to ring
it with exceptions. Just like the rights to a jury
and to counseL the right to confront witnesses
should be regarded as absolute within its
bounds. not to be overcome by a judgment that
it is not necessary in the particular case
because the evidence against the accused is so
strong. The right can be waived or forfeited.
however. Thus, if the reason that a witness
cannot testify against an accused at trial is that
the accused killed the witness, the accused has
forfeited his right to prevent a statement by the
witness form being admitted on confrontation
grounds, whether the fatal blow was struck
before or after the witness made the statement.

( 1) Results: So far as I am aware. there never
has been a case in \vhich the Supreme Court
has allowed use of a testimonial statement that
was made without the accused having had an
opportunity for cross-examination. Reliability
rhetoric has been a way of allowing in nontestimonial statements, which should not be
covered by the Clause in the first place. If, as
I believe, the testimonial approach is
compatible with all the results of Supreme
Court precedents (though not with their

So that is a very short summary of one (my)
version of the testimonial approach. The
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language), then the only impact of retaining
reliability testing can be to reduce the right.
(2) Principle: If a live witness at trial becomes
unavailable before cross, the response of our
adjudicative system is not, "Oh well, let the
jury use the evidence for what it's worth."
Rather, the evidence is struck. Why is there
any better case for allowing use of the
evidence if the testimonial statement is made
and the unavailability occurs before trial? If
anything, this is the \Veaker case, because it
does not present the situation in which the
testimony has already been heard by the jury
before the problem occurs.
(3) Problems unsofred: Retaining reliability
testing for unavailable declarants would retain
most of the unpredictability and vulnerability
to manipulation that has characterized the
Roberts approach. It would be similarly
unjustified by the text or history of the Clause.
The problems might be somewhat confined to justify bringing non-testimonial statements
outside the Confrontation bar. we would not
have to make specious statements about their
reliability - but where they existed. in the
domain of testimonial statements. they \\ould
be no less troublesome than under the current
frame\vork.
The case is scheduled for argument on
probably before this
November 10
newsletter reaches its audience.
I am
scheduled to sit at counsel table with the
petitioner's lawyer, Jeffrey Fisher, an
extremely able advocate who is, I am glad to
say, an alum of the University of Michigan
Law School. I confess that I am very excited
by the prospect that this case offers for
rediscovering the essence of one of the central
rights of our system of criminal justice.
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